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SOLDIERS OF SCIENCEAGENTS OF CULTURE
AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGISTS
IN THE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC

SERVICES

(OSS)

ABSTRACT
"Scientificity" and appeals to political independence are invaluable tools
when institutions such as the American School of Classical Studies at Athens attempt to maintain professional autonomy. Nonetheless, the cooperation of scientists and scholars with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS),
among them archaeologists affiliated -with the American School, suggests a
constitutive affinity between political and cultural leadership. This relationship is here mapped in historical terms, while, at the same time, sociological
categorizations of knowledge and its employment are used in order to situate
archaeologists in their broader social and political context and to evaluate
their work not merely as agents of disciplinary knowledge but also as agents
of culture and cultural change.
A soldier,... a diplomat,... ápolitician,... a businessman ... may be
excused if they set patriotic devotion above common everyday decency and
perform services as spies. They merely accept the code of morality to which
modern society still conforms. Not so the scientist The very essence of his
life is the service of truth.
—Franz Boas, 1919
We live in an interlocking world, in which no sphere and no area is
insulated.... [ W¿\ must choose our priorities, and do it on the basts of
inadequate evidence. To disregard consequences in the name of purity of
principle can itself often be a kind of indulgence and evasión.
—Ernest GeUner, 1990
Stationed in a country where cultural heritage is guarded with nationaUstic
fervor and latent anti-Americanism can be ignited at any time, tbe American School of Classical Studies at Athens (ASCSA) has neither celebrated
nor condemned the service of some of its most prominent members during the Second World War in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the
first American inteUigence agency.^ The School has strategicaUy engaged
1.1 am especiaUy gratefiil to Jack L.
Davis, former director ofthe ASCSA,
and NataUa Vogeikoff-Brogan, the

ASCSA archivist, for inviting me to
contribute to this volume and for faciUtating my research at the Archives of

' The American School of Classical Studies at Athens

the School. I am also thankñU for their
insightful comments and suggestions.
I would also like to thank the three
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in "boundary work,"^ emphasizing its scientific mission and nonpoUtical
disposition. "Scientificity" and appeals to poUtical independence are invaluable tools in the efforts of institutions such as the ASCSA to maintain
their professional autonomy, and, as Gieryn suggests, to seal themselves off
from outside powers and from any blame for undesirable consequences of
nonscientists' consumption of scientific knowledge.^ Yet again, the rhetoric
of scientific purism prevents us from understanding the social and historical
complexities of scientific and cultural practices. A microsociological approach, a biographical lens that wiU focus riot on "scientists qua scientists"
but on their relations with other social groups and fianctions and on their
commitments to multiple identities and roles, can offer us a more nuanced, ~
richer perspective on the place of archaeologists within the social, poUtical,
and cultural milieu in which they operate.
A discussion of American archaeologists' activities during the war may
touch upon at least two sensitive areas. First, it may be seen as a chaUenge
to the basic premises on which the relationships of foreign archaeological
institutions with their host country, Greece in this case, are based—namely,
those of pure scientific interest and independent scholarly preoccupation.
Second, it may appear to contest the presumed divide between American
archaeology in Greece and politics. In many circles, definitely in academic
ones, the relationship between archaeology and espionage is weU known.''
Studies of the relationship between archaeology and state projects such
as nation building, colonialism, and imperialism also abound, with the
lion's share undoubtedly focusing on the Middle East, since it occupies a
central place in world politics today^ More and more, the field of Greek
archaeology is also being opened up to discussions about nation building,
national identity, and representation politics,' while the role of classicism
and HeUenism as a western European project is treated in an ever-growing
Uterature.' The often contentious Greek-American post-World War II
relationship, however, has put a cap on exploring and arguing about the
social, poUtical, economic, and broader cultural role of American institutions
such as the ASCSA in the recent history of Greece. I argue, therefore, for
an open, historically grounded discussion.
A study of American archaeologists'work in espionage and inteUigence
can be framed within the postwar American agenda to broaden its sphere
anonymous Hesperia reviewers, as weU
as Volker R. Berghahn, Thomas Gallant, Evanthis HatzivassiUou, Kostis
KarpozUos, Nikolas Kosmatopoulos,
and KaUiopi Minioudaki, for carefiiUy
reading the initial manuscript and contributing their advice and assistance.
Early versions of this paper were presented at the ASCSA PhilheUenism
workshop in Athens (May 18, 2010)
and the Center for the United States
and the Cold War, the Tamiment
Library 6c Robert F. Wagner Labor
Archives, New York University (April
5,2012). I am very gratefiU to my audiences in Athens and in New York for
their discussion.

2. The term was coined by Thomas
F Gieryn (1983) to describe discursive
practices in which scientists engage to
estabUsh their epistemic authority and
to separate their work from the nonscientific world and from rival epistemic authorities. The ASCSA was
estabUshed in 1881 by a consortium of
nine American universities in coUaboration with leading businessmen as a
privately fiinded, nonprofit educational
institution with the expUcit goal to promote the study of Classics in the United
States. For the history of the School,
see Lord 1947 and Meritt 1984.
3. Gieryn 1983,1999.
4. Fierman 1986; Mabee 1987;

Clogg 2000; Richter 2008. Susan
AUen's book Classical Spies: American
Archaeologists with the OSS in World
War II Greece (2011) is the most detaUed account we have so far of the
work that the OSS undertook in the
region and of the active role that
American archaeologists played.
5. SUberman 1982; Arnold 1990;
Kohl and Fawcett 1995; MeskeU 1998;
Abu El-Haj 2001.
6. HamUakis and Yalouri 1996; Kotsakis 1998; Voutsaki 2003; HamUakis
2007; Damaskos and Plantzos 2008.
7. Morris 1994; Gourgouris 1996;
Marchand 1996; Panourgia 2004;
Güthenke 2008; Porter 2009.
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of political and economic infiuence and to impose its system of values and
ideas. Such an instrumental approach, however, despite its merits, would discount the diversity of actions and opinions within the circles of individuals
studied, as weU as the various nuances that can be distinguished in the complex relationship between inteUectual and poUtical practices. As in the case of
the Frankfurt School inteUectuals,^ it maybe argued that the archaeologists
ofthe ASCSA had a Umited influence on the prosecution ofthe war and the
government poUcies that foUowed. I suggest, however, that this episode in
the history ofthe School showcases the porous boundaries between scholarly and poUtical practices, chaUenging the proclaimed social, poUtical, and
cultural marginaUty ofthe archaeologists, speaking to their national as weU
as their scholarly identity and fiarther affirming what Pierre Bourdieu has
suggested: "capital breeds capital."'The OSS programmaticaUy drew from
and capitaUzed on the inteUectual resources of the United States, and for
the first time on such a large scale brought together the decision-making
and the scholarly elites, often creating incongruous aUiances.
The inteUectual and cultural authority that archaeologists such as
Carl W. Biegen, Rodney S. Young, M. Alison Frantz, John L. Caskey,
Dorothy H. Cox, and others were caUed upon to give to the war effort
hardly steered the course ofthe war. It did, however, provide the inteUectual
grounding that aU pubUc policy needs, and contributed to the formulation
of a narrative that first explained the need for greater American involve• ment in the region, then outlined the poUtical, economic, and ideological
future of postwar Greece. While aware of the moral compromises they
were often caUed upon to make as they navigated the treacherous and
violent poUtical waters of Greece, the archaeologists under discussion and
the institution they represented emerged invigorated from the war, and
again found themselves in a position of authority as cultural interpreters
and mediators between the two countries.

ARCHAEOLOGISTS AT WAR AND THE
PROSPECT OF A NEW WORLD ORDER
In 1942-1943, the archaeologists of the ASCSA, like many historians,
poUtical scientists, psychologists, anthropologists, scientists, and scholars
from virtuaUy aU academic disciplines and branches of knowledge, went to
war and for the most part served in various OSS posts. The OSS recruited
extensively among scholars and inteUectuals, counting on their Unguistic,
historical, and cultural knowledge of distant nations such as Greece for the
development of mUitary strategies and pubUc poUcy.^° American archaeologists affiliated with the School were recruited to serve in the Department
of Research and Analysis (R&A),'^ as Secret InteUigence officers (SI), in
8. Katz 1987.
9. Bourdieu 1988, p. 91. .
10. Mead 1979; Katz 1987; Mabee
1987.
11. The R&cA branch was headed by
Harvard historian WiUiam Langer and
employed about 900 scholars from a

variety of discipUnes: historians, economists, poUtical scientists, geographers,
psychologists, anthropologists, and diplomats. The R&A's roster included two
generations of leading scholars, such as
Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Walt W. Rostow, Edward Shils, Herbert Marcuse,

H. Stuart Hughes, Gordon Craig,
Crane Brinton, John King Fairbank,
Sherman Kent, and Ralph Bunche
(https://www.cia.gov/Ubrary/center
-for-the-study-of-inteUigence/csi
-pubUcations/books-and-monographs/
oss/art04.htm).
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CounterinteUigence (X-2), and in the Special Operations Branch (SO),
which ran gueriUa campaigns in Europe and Asia. The OSS, estabUshed
in 1942, radicaUy departed from earlier views such as those expressed by
Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, that "gentlemen do not read each
other's maU,"^^ and untU 1945, before being succeeded by the CIA, it was
the nation's central inteUigence agency."
The war declared by the ItaUans on October 28,1940, did not take the
School by surprise. As early as 1939, it had authorized Lincoln MacVeagh,
the American ambassador in Greece, to have the legation take over the
property of the School in case of emergency. In coUaboration with the
Greek archaeological authorities, measures were taken for the protection
of monuments, and records and finds were packed away in bombproof
shelters; on the initiative of some of the younger and most adventurous
members ofthe School, an ambulance was donated to the Greek Red Cross
and driven to the Albanian front." The driver, Rodney Stuart Young, who
had joined the staff of the Agora excavations in 1933 before receiving his
doctorate in classical archaeology from Princeton in 1940, would risk his
Ufe twice during the war. In the spring of 1941, he was carried to a hospital with perforated intestines after trying to drive the ambulance from
the front back to a Red Cross station." In 1945, during a mission by the
United Nations ReUef and RehabiUtation Administration (UNRRA) to
the Aegean islands, his boat capsized with great loss of life and Young was
saved only after enduring five hours in the water. ^*
Young's contribution to the war effort in Greece, and that of other
members ofthe School, however, extended far beyond the reUef and rehabiUtation work; such efforts occupied him and many ofthe others even after
their return to the United States. Some of these men were also involved
in the gradual articulation of postwar American poUcy in the region and
its disentanglement from the poUcies of its wartime aUies, primarily those
ofthe British—"the cousins," as they were often identified in code. A year
before taking up his assignment as SI officer and head ofthe Greek Desk
in Cairo in May 1943, Young had worked with the directing officers ofthe
Secret IntelUgence Services (SIS) to design and promote what was entitled
the Comprehensive Greek Project. While aUuding to the potential role of
the U.S. in the postwar world, this report at the same time identified a role
for individuals such as Young in the endeavor: "Questions of High Policy
do not come near the scope of an S.I. Officer, but the number of Americans
who are intimately identified with and who know Greece by instinct rather
than by inteUect are so few that when such an officer chances to have a
12. Stimson and Bundy 1948,
p. 188.
13. Hymoff 1972; Smith [1972]
2005; Smith 1983; Winks 1996;
O'DonneU 2004.
14. Meritt 1984, pp. 6-7.
15. ASCSA AdmRec, box 804/4,
folder 1, Gorham P. Stevens to LesUe E.
Reed, American Consul General, May
24,1941.
16. ASCSA AdmRec, box 804/2,

folder 8, "Informal Report concerning the American School of Classical
Studies at Athens, May and June
1945," Gorham P. Stevens and Aristides Kyriakides to Louis E. Lord,
July 1,1945. Young was the assistant
to the chief of UNRRA's Greek mission in Athens, a position that he held
from November 1944 untU his return
to the ASCSA to work for the Agora
excavations in 1946. In this position, he

would again find himself in the midst
ofthe batdes that raged in the center of
Athens in December 1944, driving the
trucks of UNRRA and negotiating
directly with the antartes (rebels) for
the safe passage ofthe food and suppUes he was delivering. See United
Nations Archives and Records Management Section (ARMS), UNRRA
Greek Mission: Office ofthe Chief,
PAG-4/3.0.12.0.0, box 1, S-0527-0531.
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Greek assignment, he is compeUed to recommend conference and action
beyond and outside his Une of duty."''
The Project caUed directly for "executive attention," invoking Roosevelt's philheUenism—it made the rather weak case that the President was
a member of AHEPA, a Greek-American fraternal organization, and
that his grandfather had arranged for the sale of American warships to
Greece'^—and sketching a picture of postwar America that would break
with America's long tradition of noninterventionism. Rather contemptuous of the European leadership, the Project urged that "the United
States must have their say in the estabUshment ofthe new Europe, and in
view of the record of consistent faUure in the past of the so-caUed 'Great
European Powers'. . . it would be weU that the United States had the
greatest say.""
Young, the head of the Greek Desk, took it upon himself to implement what he and his coUeagues had recommended earlier in the Comprehensive Greek Project: the mobiUzation of aU available organizations
and individuals who had estabUshed connections with the Greek state.
The Greek Orthodox Church in the U.S., the Greek Red Cross, Athens
CoUege in Athens, the American Farm School and AnatoUa CoUege in
Thessaloniki, sporting clubs, business and reUef organizations such as
Ulen ÔC Company and John Monks & Sons, a partner firm (which had
constructed the Marathon Dam and ran the Athens Water Company), the
Near East Foundation, the American Express Company, and the Standard
Oil Company aU suggested themselves "as good recruiting grounds for
agents."^° Young, however, was first and foremost an archaeologist, and
his immediate circle consisted of archaeologists, many of whom had a
long association with the ASCSA and shared strong bonds of friendship
and professional camaraderie; this would be the main pool from which
he would recruit his staff
The Greek Desk in Cairo was officiaUy estabUshed in May 1943 upon
the arrival of Young, James H. OUver, and John F Daniel, aU archaeologists
who had worked in Greece and Cyprus. Soon after, in September 1943,
SterUng Dow,^' another archaeologist and ASCSA member, would run
the office set up to estabUsh contacts and operations with bases in Cyprus,
Izmir, and Istanbul, from where networks of agents that could communicate
with the occupied areas would be buUt. The Greek SI activities in aU these
bases were, without exception, headed by individuals who had conducted
archaeological work in the region and had on occasion coUaborated on various projects. For instance, Jerome SperUng, who worked from Istanbul, and
John Caskey, head ofthe base at Izmir, both Yale University graduates and
feUow graduate students of Bkgen's at the University of Cincinnati, had
17. NACP-OSS, record group 226,
entry 190, box 3, folder 29, "The Comprehensive Greek Project."
18. See n. 17, above, "Tbe Comprebensive Greek Project."
19. See n. 17, above, "The Comprehensive Greek Project."
20. NACP-OSS, record group 226,
entry 190, box 3, folder 29, Interoffice

memo from Young to Lt. Col. UUus L.
Amoss. For more on Ulen 6c Company
and John Monks Sc Sons, see Robinson, this volume.
21. SterUng Dow (ASCSA member
1931-1936,1959-1960) was a professor of arcbaeology at Harvard University, speciaUzing in Greek inscriptions
and classical civiUzation. His obituary

in the New York Times (Januar;,' 14,
1995, p. 30) remembered him as the
person who "discovered a kleroterion, a
mechanical device that the Athenians
had used to aUot offices by random
cboice rather than through election. It
helped to explain the nature of Athenian democracy."
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coUaborated in the early 1930s in excavations at Troy, along with Marion
Rawson and Dorothy Cox, aU under the supervision of Biegen.
The partnership ofthe OSS with the American archaeological community in Greece ran deeper stiU. It was first estabUshed in Washington, D . C ,
and in Princeton at the Institute for Advanced Study, where the ASCSA
had its pubUcations office. Biegen, an eminent archaeologist known worldwide for his excavations at Troy and Pylos, who had been affiliated with the
ASCSA since 1910,^^ was recruited to head the Greek section ofthe Foreign NationaUties Branch (FNB) in Washington, D . C , with Mary AUson
Frantz as his assistant. Biegen and Frantz, whose careers are inextricably
intertwined with the history of the ASCSA, caUed upon their coUeagues
at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton early in 1942 to assist in
the composition of a monograph titled "The Kingdom of Greece," which
outUned the modern history of Greece and its current state of affairs. It was
also at the Institute that the OSS would seek ad-vice regarding personnel.
Frantz, for example, was introduced to the service by Benjamin D. Meritt,
professor of epigraphy there and longtime member ofthe ASCSA.^-' Like
many of their coUeagues, Biegen and Frantz were intimately famiUar with
modern Greece and its turbulent poUtical history; on occasion, they would
also step away from their professional Uves to serve in other capacities. In
1918, Biegen served for a year on the American Red Cross Commission,
investigating eastern Macedonia and assisting with the repatriation and
rehabiUtation of thousands of refugees who had been held as prisoners in
Bulgaria during the war.^''
For the most part, the FNB studied European and Mediterranean ethnic groups living in the United States and gathered, by tape recorder, their
knowledge of political trends and conditions affecting their native lands.
Frantz described her work as Junior Social Science Analyst as foUows:
The branch that I was concerned with was working on poUtical
movements of exiles in the United States. So many ofthe occupied countries had their statesmen, politicians, or interested persons taking refiage in aU kinds of places, and a great many of them,
of course, ended up in the United States. And we were foUowing
poUtical movements, sometimes little embryonic movements that
would burst into fuU-fledged revolution or something less violent.
But there was a great deal of poUtical activity of foreign nationaUt i e s . . . . We foUowed the local press.... I also used to see a lot of
the statesmen and poUticians who came and find out [sic] just
22. In 1939, Biegen uneartbed
the Palace of Nestor at Pylos, as weU
as clay tablets inscribed in Linear B
that, after being deciphered by Michael Ventris in the early 1950s, would
demonstrate that Greek -was spoken
in Greece already by the end of the
12th century B.C. For a short biography
of Biegen, see Caskey 1972.
23. WiUiam Donovan, the head of

the OSS, wrote personally to Theodore
LesUe Shear (director ofthe Agora
excavations untU 1945) and Young to
thank them for their contribution to
the volume. See NACP-OSS, M1642,
roU 123, frame 1097 and roU 106, frame
64, letters from Donovan dated May
16,1942. See also the memorandum to
John Cooper WUey, assistant director
of OSS, from D. C. Poole, director of

the FNB, dated January 6,1942
(NACP-OSS, M1642, roU 56, frame
762-7). Poole records his visit to the
Institute for Advanced Study together
with UUus Amoss, and their discussions
with Meritt and with Frank Aydelotte,
the Institute's director.
24. Barry 1919; see also Davis, this
volume.
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what they thought was going on. We had aU kinds of ways of
contacts with people, just to learn what they had in mind and
what they were preparing.-'
Back in the lands surrounding occupied Greece, SI and SO operations
were designed to supplement British and Greek inteUigence while serving
the particular needs of the United States, which remained largely undefined
in 1943.The OSS often emphasized its apoUtical oudook, in direct contrast
to that of the British, whose imperialistic agenda in the region was weU
known and increasingly resented by the growing resistance movement in
Greece. By the end of 1944, that resentment would grow into a fiiU-fledged
confrontation. Americans observed from afar and maintained, for a Uttle
longer, the cautious trust of aU poUtical parties in the country.
Before delving into this poUtical scene, it is vital to discuss the operations of the OSS in Greece and explore further the processes through
which American archaeologists came to inform and articulate U.S. poUcy
in the area. On the coast of Turkey, the base in Izmir directed by Caskey
was only a few mUes away from the closest Greek island. It was also the
most active, having handled a total of 30 missions by November 1944,
when it was closed down. From Izmir and two other bases along the same
coast—"Key West," which was the code name for Arslan Buru south of
Kujadasi, and "Boston," north of Ali Aga—caiques (fishing boats) infiltrated occupied Greece with OSS agents, for the most part Greek personnel
or Greek-Americans famiUar with the land and the language, in order to
estabUsh connections in the country, especiaUy with the antartesvAio were
putting up a tenacious but unequal fight against the Axis powers. Men,
documents, radio equipment, gold for payments, and other suppUes to and
from Greece and the Middle East passed chiefly through Izmir. Liaisons
with the U S . Department of State, through the embassy in Ankara and
the consulate in Izmir, and with the British, Greek, Italian, and Turkish
inteUigence services were aU handled by Caskey, operating undercover as a
Lend-Lease officer.^' The bases in Cyprus and Alexandria, run by Oliver
and Daniel, respectively, had a supporting role for the Greek SI operations
en route from Egypt to Turkey.
The gathering of inteUigence was the primary goal of the base in Izmir;
when refiigees or enemy deserters reached the base, OSS officers took the
opportunity to interview them, adding an important body of inteUigence
to the regular reports of their own agents. Dorothy Cox, who worked as a
Report Officer while undercover as a civiUan relief worker for the Greek
25. AUson Frantz Papers, PUL
(C0772), Correspondence, box 4,
folder 6. This memoir is the product
of a tape-recorded interview with
Frantz conducted for the Smith Centennial Study by JacqueUne Van Votis
on December 4,1971.
26. Lend-Lease (PubUc Law 77-11)
was the program under which the
United States suppUed tbe United

Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China,
France, and other AUied nations with
vast amounts of war material between
1941 and 1945 in return for miUtary
bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, and
tbe British West Indies. It began in
March 1941, over 18 months after the
outbreak of the war in September 1939.
See KimbaU 1969.
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War ReUef Association in Izmir,^^ provided an interesting account of her
work, as weU as the chaUenges she faced:
The refugees were questioned on military, poUtical and economic
questions.... In 1941 and 1942, thousands of poor Greeks, men,
women and children, fled to Asia Minor because of the difficulty
in obtaining food in Greece, but by early spring of 1943, shipment
of food from America had eased this situation and the majority
of those coming out were men who wished to serve in the Greek
armed forces, those who had been too active in the underground
and were wanted by the Germans and those with poUtical ambitions. From this mixed group one got a variety of opinions which
taken together gave a more or less true picture of conditions in
Greece.^*
Besides random groups of individuals, however, the base in Izmir had
estabUshed connections with the antartes: according to Cox, "as representative of the Greek War ReUef, [they] came to [her] for supplies of clothes,
food and medicine. In exchange they gave information." As for the challenges. Cox reported,
we were working in a British Theater of Influence.. .. They had a
definite policy with which we were in rather nebulous agreement
but had no clearly defined policy of our o w n . . . . This may seem
unrelated to the gathering of information, but it is not. In interviewing inteUigent men a certain give and take is necessary to inspire
confidence. At no time was it possible to give any definite answer
as to the opinion of the United States and what America was doing
about the Atlantic Charter,^' a question which arose weekly. At aU
times it was necessary to defend to some extent the rightist attitude
of Great Britain as that of an aUy with whom we were cooperating.
We could only say that our immediate objective was to win the war
and that the United States had no desire to interfere with the internal poUtics of any nation. While making my usual excuse to one
astute poUtician, saying Greek poUtics was after aU a purely Greek
affair, he interrupted to say "Oh no, it is a British affair."^"
Cox's description, together with the observations ofthe "astute politician" who aUuded to the century-old Anglo-Russian rivalry in the eastern
Mediterranean that would culminate in the "Percentages Agreement"
27. The Greek War ReUef Association (GWRA), chaired by Archbishop
of North and South America Athenagoras and Spyros P. Skouras, president
of 20th Century Fox and trustee ofthe
ASCSA (1947-1971), was formed in
the United States in October 1940,
w:!thin two weeks of the invasion of
Greece. Its objective was to coUect
fiinds with which to procure foodstuffs,
medical suppUes, and clothing. The
Association, as weU as the Greek
Orthodox Church in the U.S., worked

closely with the OSS, according to the
available archival information, providing long Usts of Greeks and GreekAmericans who could be of value to
the particular needs of the organization. The GWRA was also an exceUent
cover for OSS agents in thefieldand
was extensively used as such.
28. Memorandum entitled "What
I did in the field," to the director ofthe
OSS, January 11,1945 (NACP-OSS,
record group 226, entry 250, box 64,
folder 4).

29. The Atlantic Charter, which
was signed by Britain and the U.S. on
August 14,1941, stipulated, among
other things, that any territorial adjustments would be made in accord with
the wishes ofthe peoples concerned
and that aU peoples had the right to
self-determination. See Brinkley and
Facey-Crowther 1994. '
30. NACP-OSS, record group 226,
entry 250, box 64, folder 4; see n. 28,
above.
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between ChurchiU and StaUn,-*^ outUnes the internal poUtical rivalries in
Greece at the time as weU as the foreign imperiaUstic trends in the region.
For a better understanding ofthe poUtical and socioeconomic environment
within which the OSS operated, however, it is essential to take a closer look.

POLITICAL FACTIONALISM AND REVOLT
Greece had joined the family of European fascist governments already in
1936, before the Axis powers engulfed the country. General Metaxas's dictatorship, which was deeply rooted in the old schism between RepubUcans
and RoyaUsts over the question of monarchy, sprang from circumstances
similar to those elsewhere in Europe: the economic slump of the 1930s,
the inabUity ofthe poUtical parties to reUeve the crisis, and the rise ofthe
Communist party, which in the elections of 1936 held the balance of power.
King George II, fearing another of the many coups that had punctuated
the modern history of the country, the escalation of social unrest, the ascendance of the Communists, and probably the loss of his own position
(he had, after aU, just returned from a 12-year exile), endorsed Metaxas's
regime and presided over an ever-more divided country.-'^
The German occupation incongruously gave rise to some new prospects for change in this scene, with the emergence of a popular movement
that out of frustration with mainstream poUtics, famine, and death would
create pockets of civU society away from the traditional centers of power.
The Greek government, under the leadership of EmmanouU Tsouderos,
together with the king and elements of the Greek armed forces, moved
to Cairo, leaving the country to be ruled by a puppet government under
GeneralTsolakoglou that the Germans had instaUed. WhUe the infighting
for power would continue in Cairo, in occupied Greece various groups also
sprang up, of which the most popular and organizationaUy stable was the
National Liberation Front (EAM). Effectively led by the Communist Party
(KKE), by 1943 the EAM had emerged as the most powerfiil governing
body, with a central organization, a union arm, a youth movement, and
a miUtary branch, the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS), which
would lead the resistance movement.
Rivalries among various groups would coalesce in the opposition
between the EAM and the National RepubUcan Greek League (EDES).
The latter was supported by factions ofthe old anti-Communist poUtical
powers, on occasion coUaborated with the occupation forces, and eventuaUy
played a dubious role in the fight ofthe British against ELA.S."
31. The agreement, which took
place at the Moscow Conference on
October 9,1944, divided southeastern
Europe into spheres of influence: the
Soviet Union would exercise 90% influence in Romania, 80% in Bulgaria, and
80% in Hungary; Great Britain would
have 90% in Greece, and Yugoslavia
was equaUy divided. See Sfikas 1999.
32. Clogg 1992, pp. 115-119; Pelt
2001.

33. The account offered here is a
broad outline of a complex history that
can be studied in detaU in the numerous sources avaUable. Mazower ([1993]
2001, pp. 265-296), for example, provides an eloquent account of what he
caUs the "morality of mobilization," describing the participation of the vUlagers in "people's courts," the mechanisms
for pricing and distribution of food, and
other reforms in which common people

actively participated for the first time.
Mazower also paints an intriguing picture ofthe ideological struggles within
EAM and against long-estabUshed
traditions, as weU as the dark and
oppressive side of the movement, which
prosecuted and often swiftly executed
enemy coUaborators or other elusive
opponents. See also Hondros 1983 and,
for fiirther bibUography, Fleischer and
Bowman 1981; Koulouris 2000.
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The British poUcy toward the resistance movement in Greece was ambivalent, ambiguous, and underhanded, to say the least. While the British
Special Operations Executive (SOE) was ordered to carry out inteUigence
and sabotage operations among the antartes in the mountains of Greece and
to serve as the communications link between Cairo and Greek resistance
organizations, a systematic effort was made to keep this coUaboration on
strictly miUtary terms.^"* As the war was coming to a close and the time for
political choices neared, the British openly pitted EDES against EAM,
undermining the latter's authority.-'' WiUiam Donovan, the head of the
OSS, in a memorandum to the jointchiefs of staff dated November 26,
1943, characterized the situation as foUows:
OriginaUy, aU gueriUa groups in Greece were set up under a joint
G H Q i over which the senior British liaison officer presided although his functions were, strictly speaking, only advisory. The
poUtical situation has changed this and now it is the proposed policy of the British to attempt to build up the EDES group in opposition to the EAM group which is to be starved of supplies and
attacked on the propaganda front.^'
As Cox had pointedly stated in her report, the U.S. had no definite
poUcy for Greece, and consequently the OSS operated largely independent
of any overarching governmental directive other than that of strict objectivity. Some of the most important missions in the region were designed
and, upon approval from Headquarters in Washington, implemented by
the Greek Desk in Cairo and the other bases abroad. Early in 1944, the
acceleration of events in Greece found the OSS rather invigorated, prone to
act ahead of the government it was serving and even independently of the
British authorities, who were by now openly resented by the antartes. It was
assessed that due to the lack of trust between the antartes and the British,
the inteUigence that the OSS received through British channels was biased
and inadequate. The Greek Desk, therefore, took it upon itself to go where
no one had been able to go before—the Central Headquarters of EAM.
In March 1944, the Political Committee of National Liberation
(PEEA), also caUed the "Mountain Government," in effect a third Greek
government, was elected and set in motion a series of events:-'^ a mutiny of
factions ofthe Greek army in Cairo, its violent suppression by the British,
and ultimately the initiation of discussions between the government-ine:dle and EAM for a unity government.^^ In the midst of these events, the
34.Woodbousel948.
35. The tactic of divide et impera
on which the British Empire thrived
was appUed in neighboring Yugoslavia
a? weU, where infighting between the
resistance groups led by Tito and MihaUo-vic was greatly encouraged. The
constitutional future of both countries,
Yugoslavia and Greece, was at stake
and in both cases British poUcy was
unabashedly pro-monarchical. See
Auty and Clogg 1975; Vlavianos

1989; Wheeler 1989.
36. NACP-OSS, record group 226,
entry 99, box 54, folder 1, "History of
OSS Cairo."
37. Orchestrated by EAM, tbe "revolutionary elections" of 1944 brougbt
togetber tbe revolutionaries, who advocated a complete break witb the traditional poUtical authorities, and the
reformists, who maintained that some
degree of coUaboration witb the government-in-exile would lead to national

unity. Most importantly, however, this
show of unity expressed the people's
hope for a better Ufe and some form of
self-determination. For an analysis of
the nature of these elections and the
problems surrounding them, see
Mazower [1993] 2001, pp. 291-296.
38. The discussions in May 1944
led to the Lebanon Agreement and tbe
"Unity Government" under George
Papandreou (tbe Britisb choice for the
leadership), providing for 24 ministers.
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Greek Desk managed to instaU three of its agents in the EAM headquarters with the general objective of "obtaining at first hand current strategic
inteUigence . . . exclusively through American channels."^' The Pericles
Mission, as it was known, was led by Costas Couvaras, a native Greek who
had studied political science and history at CorneU University; it sought
to secure an aUiance with the Central Committee ofthe EAM and, in the
face of recent developments, to specialize in poUtical reporting. EAM,
entirely disiUusioned with the British, and despite the avowals ofthe OSS
that it "was without authority to make any poUtical commitments and
that the sole modus vivendi must be a common desire to bring about the
enemy's destruction," compUed with the proposition.''" It was evident that
the poUtical fiiture ofthe country, once again, would not be entirely in the
hands of its own people, if at aU, and EAM therefore cautiously examined
the possibiUty of new alliances.

THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL CAPTAINS AS
COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS
We had been at war with Germany longer than any other power, we
had suffered more, we had sacrificed more, and in the end we would lose
more than any other power. Yet here were these God-awful American
academics rushing about, talking about the Four Freedoms and the
Atlantic Charter, and criticizing mfor doing successfully what they
would try and fail to do themselves later—restrain the Russians.
—Sir Ronald Wingate
British Colonel Wingate's grievance succinctly summarizes the often contentious relations between the SOE and the OSS and its so-caUed archaeological captains, a term first used to refer to the many archaeologists and
classicists staffing the Greek Desk in Cairo."' The prevalent perception
was that certain ofthe archaeological captains were sympathetic to EAM.
On one occasion at least. Ambassador MacVeagh would caU Young to
account for the misconduct in the field of OSS agents who were aUegedly
supporting EAM."^ Costas Couvaras was a case in point.
Couvaras spent more than five months in the mountains with the
Pericles Mission, reporting extensively on EAM's activities; in his colorfiil
portrayal of the antartes' endurance of hardships and struggles for social
justice, he often glossed over the atrocities and cold-blooded assassinations
that he -witnessedfirsthand."-'The Pericles Mission pressed for the development of 12 or more large operations that would cover the whole country
six of whom came from EAM. The
agreement, which did not settle the
issue of disarmament, would eventuaUy
be breached in December of the same
year.
39. NACP-OSS, record group 226,
entry 99, box 55, folder 1, "OutUne of
SI, OSS/Cairo."
40. See n. 39, above.

41. For the epigraph above, see
Nalmpantis 2010, p. 156, quoting from
Cave Brown 1982, p. 609. The quotation is also found in Winks 1996,
p. 214 and Clogg 2000, p. 135. Wingate was probably referring to Moses
Hadas's critical analyses of British
activities in Greece. Hadas, an eminent
Unguist and classicist who taught at

Columbia University, worked extensively for tbe OSS, traveUng between
Cairo, Cyprus, and Greece, and reporting on aU developments on the field at
the time. For the term "archaeological
captains," see Clogg 2000, p. 112.
42. Nalmpantis 2010, p. 160.
43. Couvaras 1982.
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and would depend on closer coUaboration between EAM and OSS, but
the proposal would ultimately be rejected. In the midst of intense political activity in Cairo, the U S . government hesitated to take a more direct
approach, and for a little longer remained almost indifferent to the urgent
caUs from the OSS field agents for direct action.'*''
Couvaras sympathized with a people that had become disillusioned
with the traditional political elite and, in the middle of an atrocious occupation, had set up their own independent organizations to distribute food,
and mete out justice, although they were often vindictive and excessive
in their punishments. Given the likely grim political future of postwar
Greece, EAM appeared to many as the most viable prospect; to others,
its ascent to power was a catastrophic scenario. The modest aspirations
of young people such as Pavlos, a gueriUa whose "great ambition in life
[was] neither to become a policeman nor to get a comfortable government
job [but to] go to America and open a restaurant," touched Couvaras the
most, however, and he identified an opportunity for American policy."^
In the meantime, the antartes' leadership had a single objective in mind.
In the words of Yannis Ioannides, the KKE second-in-command during
the war:
There was this American agent that we had acquired over at
General Headquarters.... I wanted to takefioUadvantage of him.
But [his superiors] were s m a r t . . . what probably happened is that
his superiors figured, "Look at that idiot, we sent him to sucker
them and he was the one who got suckered." So it aU stopped . . .
but by that point in time we reaUy didn't need him as much since
the end was approaching . . . but those brand new weapons that
they gave us were immediately sent to Athens . . . three or four
separate d r o p s . . . aU of it directly to Athens.''^

LÍBERATION, CIVIL STRIFE, AND AMERICAN
REALPOLITIK
In February 1944, on Young's initiative, the Greek Desk had akeady drawn
up what came to be known as the Young Plan, an operation that envisaged
the spreading of OSS personnel aU over Greece as quickly as possible after
the German evacuation.'''' It was by now clear to everyone that a period
of unrest would foUow, and the Young Plan held that "in this period of
uncertainties, independent, uncolored secret information regarding Greek
internal and international affairs wiU provide a basis for the formulation
44. The proposal met with resistance even in Cairo, before it reached
the Washington, D.C, headquarters.
For instance. Young and Penrose (chief
of SI of the Near East Division in
Cairo), who were closer to the arduous
political negotiations in Cairo at the
time, identified the dangers of breaching relations with the British as weU as
wiih the Greek government in Cairo,

and rejected the proposed plan. See
NACP-OSS, record group 226,
entry 99, box 35, folder 5, "MEDTO
DaUy Report, Monday, 10 July 1944":
"Young, Penrose, Mac [MacVeagh] and
I aU strongly disapprove plan of gathering inteUigence from EAM-ELAS, as
operations of great proportions are no
longer necessary in Greece.... Hazardous poUtical repercussions with British

and Greeks would result if Americans
were to assist ELAS."
45. Couvaras 1982, p. 48.
46. Ioannidis 1979, pp. 294-295,
as translated by Nalmpantis (2010,
p. 334).
47. NACP-OSS, record group 226,
entry 154, box 34, folder 518, memorandum dated February 10,1944, from
Young to Lt. Col. John Toulmin.
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of U.S. poUcy not only toward Greece and her neighboring Balkan states,
but toward the other, larger powers which have interests in those states.""^
Young, along with Lieutenant Colonel JohnToulmin (a Harvard University
graduate who was to become the vice president ofthe First National Bank
of Boston), successor of Amoss as head ofthe OSS in Cairo, designed the
operation and entered Greece on October 12,1944, the day the Germans
withdrew from Athens. Young, who headed the first smaU advance team in
Athens, temporarUy estabUshed a smaU office at 9 Ploutarchou Street, an
address in Athens closely connected with the history ofthe ASCSA since
1929."" Soon after, the offices were moved to 1 Phidiou Street, the then
vacant German Archaeological Institute building that had served during
the occupation as the headquarters of the German inteUigence services.
According to one of its first refxjrts, the Young team found its own intelUgence customers on their knees on its doorstep.^"
As much as a year after the Young Plan was operationaUzed, its agents
found themselves without clear directives. With very little direction from
Washington and on the pretext that the OSS was in Greece to dismantle
operations and not to introduce new ones, the team responded to requests
for information from the AUied Military Liaison (AML), UNRRA, and
the U.S. Embassy in Athens. At the time, the embassy would have had
access only to information provided by the Greek government, which had
recently moved back from Cairo but controUed only Athens and Piraeus.
The rest ofthe country was effectively in the hands of EAM, while a small
part of Epirus was now controUed by EDES. By the time ofthe liberation,
the OSS had 23 missions in Greece^' reporting on economic, poUtical, and
miUtary conditions in the country, now not only to the OSS director via
Cairo but also directly to MacVeagh, who would even recommend that the
OSS be put under the control and authority ofthe embassy. ^^
In contrast to the OSS's audacity in the field, the American government's reaction was protracted and hesitant. MacVeagh succinctly summarized the situation in one of his many "Dear FrankUn" letters addressed
to President Roosevelt: "ParentheticaUy, I reaUze that Yugoslavia,—and
Greece to an even greater extent,—are very smaU potatoes stiU in the
typical American view of foreign affairs." He emphasized, however, the
importance that the region, together with the Near East, would hold for
48. NACP-OSS, record group 226,
entry 154, box 34, folder 518, "Special
Plan for SI Activities in Greece, Statement ofthe Problem," August 29,1944.
Young, as weU as anyone with a good
knowledge ofthe issues in the region,
anticipated that rivalries among the
various poUtical parties in postwar
Greece and the territorial disputes between Greeks and Albanians, as weU as
Bulgarians, would lead to poUtical and
social unrest, if not civU war. Already at
the heart of these concerns in 1944,
however, was the possibiUty that the
unpopularity of British poUcy among
the Greeks would result in a swing

of Greek pubUc opinion toward the
U.S.S.R., and possibly the increase
of Russian poUtical influence in the
country.
49. The house at 9 Ploutarchou, ^
known as the Biegen House, had been
the residence of Carl Biegen and Bert
Hodge HLU, directors ofthe ASCSA at
different times, and their wives EUzabeth Pierce Biegen and Ida ThaUon
HUl, also archaeologists, from 1929
untU 1971. A gathering place for
archaeologists and aU kinds of distinguished personaUties, the house became
closely Unked with the cultural Ufe of
the ASCSA. The Biegens and the HUls

are buried in the Protestant section of
the First Cemetery of Athens.
50. NACP-OSS, record group 226,
entry 99, box 52, folder 4, "Thirteenth
Semimonthly Report of Activities of
OSS-ME (for period October 31 to
November 15,1944)" to the director of
Strategic Services, Washington, D.C.
51. NACP-OSS, record group 226,
entry 99, box 57, folder 6, "Greece,
AccompUshments During Past Year,
Operations between 1 May 1944 and
the Liberation of Athens on 12 October 1944."
52. Iatrides 1980, p. 633.
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American poUcy, drawing attention to the weakening ofthe British empire
and the need for a new kind of foreign policy:
I doubt if in any other part of the world it can appear so clearly
as here,—along its principal artery,—that, miUtarily speaking, the British Empire is anachronistic, perfect for the eighteenth century,
impossible for the twentieth.... The future maintenance of the
Empire depends on how far England consents to frame her foreign
poUcy in agreement with Washington, and how far we in our turn
reaUze where that Empire, so important to our own security, is most
immediately menaced.'^
MacVeagh concluded his letter with a long quotation from an OSS agent's
report that acknowledged the strength ofthe movement created by EAM,
the need for compromise between the traditional poUtical forces and EAM,
and the failures of British poUtical maneuvering. But he would shy away
from making any predictions for the immediate future, which was soon
to take a gory turn.
MacVeagh largely expressed the views held by most ofthe OSS officers
discussed above. Antimonarchical in principle, opposed to British colonial
httgh-handed attitudes, and sympathetic to the struggles of EAM, the OSS,
with its firsthand knowledge of the conditions on the ground, advocated
for the development of a systematic American poUcy that would invite
EAM to participate in the postwar poUtical negotiations. The OSS officers
did not, however, advocate the estabUshment of a Communist regime; on
the contrary, they envisioned Greece as the last stronghold against Soviet
expansion in southeastern Europe.
In the Comprehensive Greek Project, designed in 1942, Young and
his coUeagues had stressed the importance of operations in the country
based on a nine-point argument that emphasized its strategic location for
obstructing any fiiture attempts by the Axis against the Suez Canal and
the oil fields of Iraq, as weU as for immediate operations against Axis-held
Yugoslavia and Italy. The ninth point anticipated the postwar aUgnment
of powers: "The presence of AUied forces in Southeastern Europe might
serve as a check on possible Russian moves after the coUapse of Germany. A Balkan front would serve at the same time as a prop and check
to Russia."" In 1942 and even untU 1947, when President Harry Truman
would ask the U.S. Congress to join him in the struggle to "support free
psoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by
outside pressures,"" itwas unclear what this poUcy would consist of, but its
53. Iatrides 1980, pp. 627-628.
54. NACP-OSS, record group 226,
entry 190, box 3, folder 29, "The Comprehensive Greek Project."
55. Truman's address before a joint
session of Congress on March 12,1947,
which became known as the Truman
Doctrine, established the principles of
U.S. foreign poUcy at the time, requesting $400 million in aid to Greece and
Tarkey as weU as authorization to send

American military and economic advisors. Truman argued that "one ofthe
primary objectives ofthe foreign policy
ofthe United States is the creation of
conditions in which we and other
nations wiU be able to work out a way
of Ufe free from coercion. This was a
fiindamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won
over countries which sought to impose
their violl, and their way of life, upon

other nations." The new enemy, unspoken in his address to Congress,
was none other than the U.S.S.R., and
Truman would now caU for its containment by saving Greece and Turkey
from perceived Russian influence. The
Truman Doctrine was the first in a
series of containment moves that wotUd
soon take the U.S. as far afield as Korea
and Vietnam.
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inteUectual base was slowly taking shape over these years; the archaeologists
and scholars who worked for the OSS played a more or less direct role in
this process.
The events that foUowed the Uberation confirmed the long-held fears,
already expressed in 1942 by Young and aU the authors ofthe Comprehensive Greek Project, that poUtical factionaUsm would lead to civU war. Less
than two months after the German troops' departure from Athens, and
foUowing EAM's demonstration of December 3,1944, images of British
troops fighting in the streets of Athens against one of the most resilient
anti-Nazi movements in Europe caused rage in the House of Commons
and in the British and American media. Whether the demonstration represented a takeover attempt by EAM is stiU a hody debated issue, as is
the ensuing role played by the Soviet Union in the conflict." According to
Biegen, the 37-day battle that foUowed between the British troops, Greek
government forces, and EAM-ELAS constituted "a carefuUy laid plan for
the seizure of power by the Left," into which the British "were inevitably
drawn... in support ofthe government, as the legaUy constituted regime.""
The British went from Uberators to instigators of a brutal civil war, further
inflamed after the March 1946 elections and the September plebiscite that
brought the king back. The issue that had been polarizing Greek society
since the early 1920s and had for years brought negotiations between the
more moderate poUtical forces to a standstiU was forced upon the Greeks
by ChurchiU's myopic and nostalgic colonialist vision.'^
The moral compromises that were made in the process of achieving
at least a semblance of poUtical stabUity were obvious to aU American archaeologists who foUowed these events; only on a few occasions, however,
were they openly criticized. In the summer of 1947, for instance, ASCSA
staff members Robert L. Scranton and David M. Robinson criticized, to
Uttle avail, the suppression of civU rights in Greece and the compUcity
of the American Mission in the New York Times and the Baltimore Sun,
56. Answers to the first question
vary, from, e.g., that of L. S. Stavrianos
(1949), who argued that there was no
plot on the part of EAM, to that of
WUUam H. McNeUl (1949), U.S. miUtary attaché to Greece (1944-1946),
who asserted that on December 6,
1944, EAM attempted a coup d'état
when it attacked the main government
buildings. For a more nuanced
approach, see Iatrides and Rizopoulos
(2000), who argue for a Communist
coup-in-the-making that may have
been either part of a larger master plan
or simply an attempt to gain leverage
pending fiirther negotiations. On the
part that Moscow played in the conflict,
scholars generaUy agree that the Soviet
government, in adherence to the agreements akeady made with the British,
did not encourage a Communist uprising. What has been debated, bowever.

is wbetber a Communist victory would
have encouraged Soviet penetration, an
argument central to Cold War poUtics
in the region. The most recent, and
controversial, pubUcation on the topic
(Marantzidis 2010) emphasizes the
coercive nature of the Democratic
Army of Greece (DSE; the miUtary
arm of EAM after 1946 that was effectively controUed by tbe KKE) and of its
leadersbip, poised for power, as weU as
tbe systematic assistance that the DSE
received from the governments of
Yugoslavia and Albania, and perbaps
secretly and indirectly from tbe
U.S.S.R.
57. Biegen 1948, p. 133 (ASCSA
Carl W. Biegen Papers, box 25,
folder 3). In 1945, wbUe he was stUl
in the employ of the FNB in Washington, D.C, Biegen was invited by Harvard University Press to contribute a

volume on Greece for a series focusing on tbe importance of various
parts of tbe world to tbe foreign relations ofthe United States. This manuscript (Biegen 1948), which was
never pubUsbed, provided an overview of Greek history and, in keeping
with the project, explained Greece's
geopoUtical importance to American
interests. For more on Blegen's unpubUsbed book, see Lalaki 2012, esp.
pp. 556-566. See also Davis, this volume, p. 19, n. 16.
58. Roosevelt himself, howe\-er,
appears to have been responsible for
the King of Greece not going ahead
with the plebiscite, which had already
received British assent. In December
1943, whUe in Cairo, for obscure reasons be advised the king to reject the
plan: Nalmpantis 2010, p. 121.
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respectively.^' On the other hand. Biegen condoned British.policy, or at
least viewed it as inevitable, given the prospect of a Communist takeover.
According to Biegen, the AUied Mission for Observing Greek Elections
(AMFOGE), with British, French, and American participants, guaranteed
that "it was unquestionably as fair and honest an election as could be held in
a country so recently torn by civU war."'° He was equaUy encouraging about
the plebiscite that recaUed the king to the throne: "The result unquestionably represented the conviction ofthe majority ofthe Greek people that at
the time the only possible safeguard against Communist domination lay
in raUying about the King and the monarchical form of regime."'' Alison
Frantz, who had taken part in the A M F O G E in March 1946 and foUowed
events closely, was less sanguine, however; on August 24,1946, she wrote
to her mother, rather cynicaUy and resignedly: "The plebiscite is scheduled
for a week from today. No one has any iUusions about the outcome. It wiU
probably be technicaUy honest, in that the King won't get 107% of the
votes as he did last time, but only the very brave repubUcans wiU dare to
vote. I'm glad I wasn't involved in A M F O G E II.""
FoUowing Truman's caU for economic assistance to Greece in 1947,
American involvement would henceforth be systematic and decisive.
While the emphasis of American poUcy toward Europe in general was on
reconstruction and economic development, the problems in Greece were
primarily political and miUtary.The implementation ofthe MarshaU Plan
in Greece was in effect an exercise in Realpolitik meant to defend U.S.
strategic interests in the area. Fearing that the expansion of Soviet infiuence in Greece would mean the faU ofthe Middle East, American advisors
and administrators brought the entire Greek state apparatus under their
direct control, openly manipulated the Greek government, gave almost
absolute control to the military, which they separated from civil political
authority, and tolerated mass executions and the open persecution of the
Left by a regime that, in the American media, was often compared with
that ofthe Nazis."

ARCHAEOLOGISTS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
TREASON OR RESPONSIBILITY?
On December 20,1919, under the heading "Scientists as Spies," The Nation published a letter by Franz Boas, the father of academic anthropology
in America. In it. Boas charged that four American anthropologists had
abused their professional research positions by conducting espionage in
Central America during the First World War. He strongly condemned
their actions, stating that they had "prostituted science by using it as a.
59.1 thank NataUa VogeikoffBrogan for bringing Scranton's letter to
the New York Times ("Greek Situation
Appraised: Cessation of Suppression
Held First Step in Solving Nation's
Problems," July 15,1947, p. 22) to my
attention. The Baltimore Sun article
("Dr. Robinson Finds Greece Graft

Ridden," November 3,1947, p. 26) is
mentioned in a letter from Louis E.
Lord (chairman of the Managing
Committee, 1939-1950) to the staff
ofthe ASCSA on November 14,
1947 (ASCSA AdmRec, box 310/8,
folder 2).
60. Biegen 1948, p. 148.
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cover for their activities as spies." According to Boas, other professionals
such as soldiers, diplomats, politicians, and businessmen "may be excused
if they set patriotic devotion above common everyday decency and perform
services as spies. They merely accept the code of moraUty to which modern
society StiU conforms. Not so the scientist. The very essence of his Ufe is
the service of truth.""
Boas's scathing critique reproduces many of the normative definitions
of scientists' and inteUectuals' obUgations and moral codes. JuUen Benda,
possibly the founding theorist of the sociology of inteUectuals, defined them
as "aU those whose activity is not in the pursuit of practical aims, aU those
who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science or metaphysical
speculation," and he maintained that their duty was "to set up a corporation whose sole cult is that ofjustice and of truth."*^ According to Edward
Said, marginaUty and exile provide the conditions for the emergence of the
true inteUectual.'^ Furthermore, due to their devotion to ideas not always
in harmony with society's more pragmatic concerns, inteUectuals can often
find themselves alienated.'^
Since modernity seems to have replaced faith with reason and reUgion
with science, inteUectuals and scientists have come to embody what our
modern societies hold sacred: objective knowledge independent of personal
interests and subject only to observation, experiments, and the laws of
nature. Archaeology as a discipUne has gone to great lengths to estabUsh
itself as a science, and the ASCSA's archaeologists have every reason to
take pride in their adherence to rigorous methodology, attention to minute
detail, and use of modern technologies in their research endeavors. The
definitions of Boas, Benda, and even Said reflect precisely this ideal type
of knowledge to which inteUectual Ufe aspires.
Yet the story discussed here and, indeed, world history suggest otherwise.'^ Said's pubUc inteUectual Ufe is, after aU, a testament to the fact
that marginaUty does not necessarily indicate an apoUtical inteUectual Ufe.
Scholars, inteUectuals, and scientists are more directly engaged with the
pubUc sphere than has often been acknowledged. As critics of orthodoxy
and dogma (a common connotation of the term "inteUectual"),'' as counselors and advisors to governments, experts are an integral part of pubUc
and poUtical Ufe. Practical reaUties require that our societies and, stUl more,
democracies depend on experts and expert knowledge.'" The history of
modernity and of the state itself is coterminous with the history of the
rise of the inteUectual,'' and, as Zygmunt Bauman fiirthermore asserts,
"there is a constitutive affinity between the poUtical rulers and the cultural
leaders... the relation is, rather, of a Haßliebe type. Suspicion and dissent
constantly alternate with a powerfiil attraction—nay, fascination—with
the power of the state."'^ The extensive literature on nationaUsm, state
formation, and state projects such as colonization and empire building
64. Boas 1919.
65. Benda 1927, pp. 43, 45.
66. Said 1996, pp. 47-65.
67. See, e.g., Lipset 1972; ShUs
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points to the importance of inteUectualism and scholarly production for
establishing and maintaining rule.'^
The coUaboration between the OSS and Biegen, Young, and most of
the archaeologists associated with the ASCSA and Greece at that time
indicates not a merely lukewarm relationship with the American government, but a conscious political engagement and commitment to the liberal
American ideals of democracy, popular sovereignty, and self-determination.
Yet their commitment, as often happens, did not extend to direct, overt criticism oftheir government when it became clear that the road to democracy
was taking a few very undemocratic detours. At that point, their national
aUegiance and ideological choices proved stronger than their inteUectual
and professional commitment to truth and impartiality. They identified
the role that the U.S. was caUed upon to play within the new emerging
world system and they saw the strategic importance of Greece in America's
impending rivalry with the Soviet Union; many of them acknowledged
the need for political change, to which a compromise between EAM and
the traditional political eUte could lead. Cautious about their own professional futures, as weU as that of the institution they represented, however,
they refrained from any pubUc expression of their discontent and quietly
transferred responsibiUty to the public-poUcy experts.
But how can we account for these events in the inteUectual history
of the ASCSA without reaching the impasse that dichotomies such as
"treason" versus "responsibility" can generate? The argument developed
by Yannis HamUakis with regard to the broader role of archaeologists
in the field of cultural production and their respective responsibiUties as
inteUectuals is situated precisely at the center of this dichotomy. He argues
that along with the realization that the archaeological record preserves
only fragmented material traces ofthe past that are produced as a "record"
or "evidence" comes a certain inteUectual responsibiUty to chaUenge the
regimes ofthe "production of truths" and to interrogate the links of knowledge with power.'^"'
I suggest that we can further qualify this argument, which assumes a
complete break between political and inteUectual authority, by directing
our attention to the various ways that knowledge is employed and the
different publics that it often addresses. Michael Burawoy, for instance,
distinguishes among four types of sociological knowledge that can, by
analogy, be discerned in the field of archaeology as weU; he discusses and
differentiates among policy, public, professional, and critical knowledge,
aU four forms being interdependent, albeit antagonistic at times.^' Policy
sociology, he argues, responds to specific requests and goals set by a cUent,
providing answers and solutions to any given set of problems. Public sociology, on the other hand aspires to generate dialogue between sociology
and a pubUc. Not unlike policy sociology, it is practiced outside the strict
academic boundaries ofthe discipline in the pubUc sphere—in the media,
for instance. Unlike poUcy sociology, however, which is often practiced in
very private spheres bounded by expertise, knowledge, and authority, pubUc
sociology invites the community—the public—into a dialectic relationship. Neither policy nor public is possible, however, without professional
sociology, which "supplies true and tested methods, accumulated bodies
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of knowledge, orienting questions, and conceptual frameworks."^* Professional sociology consists of multiple intersecting research programs, fields,
and subfields; it is institutionaUy bounded; and, to borrow from Bourdieu's
theory of fields," it constitutes its own structured social space: it has, among
other things, its own rules, schemes of domination, and legitimate opinions.
Lastly, critical sociology, the conscience of professional sociology, in the
same way that public sociolog}' is the conscience of poUcy sociology, is
meant to examine the foundations of professional sociology, and stands
for reflexivity within the discipline's professional circles.
Burawoy's categorical distinctions point to the differentiated uses of
sociological knowledge, further suggesting that each aspect of the discipline has its own sets of truths to which it adheres, draws legitimization
from different sources, has its own accountability, and, last, has its own
pathologies. Most importantly, Burawoy makes a distinction between
sociology and its internal divisions and the sociologists, who at any time
may occupy multiple locations and cut across the various divisions ofthe
discipline.
Archaeologists, too, may find themselves in different trajectories in
their field—occupying academic positions, for instance, working from
within the estabUshed norms and theoretical frameworks of their profession, while advising the state on issues of cultural heritage management
and development, thereby applying their professional expertise to issues of
pubUc poUcy and administration. The development of archaeological parks
and museums, the promotion of ctiltural and archaeological tourism, and
the institution of cross-national research and educational programs—to
mention only a few examples—are based on the close coUaboration of what
we can caU "professional" and "poUcy" archaeology. The pubUc is, most
often inadvertently, invited into the discussion, since questions of culture
often touch upon daily concerns and issues related to urban development
and economic considerations, as weU as questions of power, authority, and
identity. The removal in the 1930s of over 500 private residences that stood
on top ofthe ancient Agora of Athens to make way for the excavation of
the site, or the development in the 1990s of the archaeological site and
museum at Vergina, a project closely entangled with national and identity
poUtics in Macedonia, exempUfy the pubUc character of archaeology and the
pressures that this aspect ofthe field can place on professional archaeology.
Like any field dedicated to the production and promotion of knowledge,
archaeology has a strong ethical, political, and cultural dimension that
places it in direct dialogue with society and the public.
In the 1980s Michael Shanks and Christopher TiUey argued persuasively that the field of archaeology was in a state of deep crisis,^^ which
to a great extent reflected the reluctance of the discipline to consider the
lessons learned from a series of critiques coming from the directions of
critical theory, feminist studies, hermeneutics, and poststructuraUsm. In
brief, archaeology, holding firm to its commitment to construct a disinterested and objective understanding ofthe past, feU out of tune with its social
reaUty. Lacking a more reflexive and critical standpoint, archaeology and
its practitioners were faiUng to address two vital questions: "archaeology
for whom?" and "archaeology for what?"
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The ASCSA, from within the boundaries of scholarship and professionaUsm, has carefuUy refrained from public discussions that pertain to
the products of its work, while also cautioning its members against any
i.-ivolvement in activities that may have poUtical consequences.^' Moreover,
i-: has engaged only hesitantly with critical archaeology and the discussions
that take place among critical inteUectuals who may transcend discipUnary
boundaries. A discussion ofthe ASCSA's partnership with the OSS may
seem an embarrassment in the history of an institution that has so carefiiUy
Grafted its nonpoUtical image. Archaeologists, along with anthropologists
and scholars generaUy, however, have always shaped policy, and not merely
the development of cultural poUcy. Again today, in the face ofthe obstacles
presented by Afghanistan and Iraq, the AUied forces together with the U.S.
Department of Defense are caUing for greater cultural insight. Scholars
have certainly been invited to participate in the discussion; it is clear that
many have already responded to the caU and that others wiU foUow.*°
The OSS story offers an opportunity to discuss an event in the history
cf the ASCSA that is neither exceptional nor unique. It may appear sinister,
hut only if it remains concealed from the public sphere and unexamined
by the archaeologists themselves, who ought to engage in reflexivity not
merely as practitioners within their field but also as social, poUtical, and
cultural agents. The coUaboration between the OSS and the academic
community was mandated by historical'circumstances and hardly constitutes "treason" vis-à-vis the archaeologists' inteUectual and professional
cbUgations. I maintain, however, that our scholarly practices have a strong
social dimension, that our cultural and research institutions are accountable
not only to peer review but also to the publics that they serve, direcdy or
indirectly. Dialogue among the various divisions of archaeological labor
can only lead to greater democratization of knowledge.

COMING HOME TO ROOST
PoUtical and inteUectual activities occupy different spheres, and, as Edv/^ard ShUs has pointed out, they cannot be practiced simultaneously over
extended periods of time.^'TraditionaUy, scholars are more committed to
tiieir discipUnary traditions and obUgations than to their political or other
civil responsibiUties. Most ofthe archaeologists affUiated with the ASCSA
returned to work as soon as the occupation was over, whUe the fight between
tiie EAM and the government was stiU raging in Athens. The city, and
to an even greater extent the rest of Greece, would be a dangerous place
f^Dr travel and research for some time to come, but new opportunities for
institutional advancement soon became very clear. The postwar American
intervention in Greece created a favorable poUtical and economic environment for the work of institutions such as the ASCSA. Many of its members,
such as Biegen, Frantz, and Caskey, were also advantageously positioned
as weU-connected and experienced pubUc servants by the end of the war.
Biegen would serve as cultural attaché ofthe U.S. Embassy in Athens for
a year; in 1946 he would be succeeded by Frantz, who served until 1949.
While in these positions, using networks of pubUc officials and individuals
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with great financial resources who were for various reasons drawn into the
Greek postwar situation, they would work hard to advance the interests
ofthe ASCSA.
The inteUectual and cultural capital ofthe ASCSA, which since 1931
has been excavating in the Athenian Agora, the civic center of ancient Athens, presents infinite opportunities to celebrate the victories of democracy.
From this angle. Biegen energeticaUy lobbied for the inclusion of a museum
for the ancient Agora in a MarshaU Plan project for the reconstruction and
rehabiUtation of Greek museums in the interest of advancing tourism and
economic development.^-^ Frantz was instrumental in the estabUshment of
the Fulbright Foundation in Greece, a program through which for years
the ASCSA would draw a disproportionate share of the applicant pool,
fiirther soUdifying the institution's position as the sole point of entry for
American archaeologists, historians, and classicists in Greece.^-' The first
decade of the postwar American presence in Greece was one of the most
productive for the ASCSA. Under Caskey's directorship (1949-1959), the
School would complete one of its most ambitious and symboUcaUy burdened projects, clearly proclaiming the American commitment to Uberty
and democracy: the reconstruction ofthe Stoa of Attalos as the museum
ofthe ancient Agora.^"The museum, an undertaking that the School had
been planning and negotiating with the Greek archaeological authorities
for years before the war, would evolve into an over $3 million enterprise
that tied into the broader discussions of the time about Greece's fiiture.
The promotion of cultural heritage raised great hopes for the growth of
tourism and economic development and, in consequence, poUtical stabiUty
and democratization.
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85. Boyer and Lomnitz 2005,
p. 110.

If the archaeologists' coUaboration -with the OSS seems Uke a tale of
strange bedfeUows, an improbable relationsbip forged in the extremities
ofthe war, closer examination ofthe ASCSA's postwar work may fijrther
iUuminate the reciprocity of the relationship between administrative and
scholarly preoccupations. If "the arts of domination and administration
require attention to rhetoric, ideological invention, and communication
across different stations as weU as rational calculation," as Dominic Boyer
and Claudio Lomnitz propose, scholarly and inteUectual activities are
enabled by the poUtical and economic networks in which they are embedded.^^ Ultimately, by recognizing the agency of American archaeologists
in state projects such as the one undertaken by the OSS, and by bringing
them out of their dimly Ut offices and silent Ubraries into the public light,
we of necessity redefine and reixnagine their role in relation to the societies
and the pubUcs that they serve.
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